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1. Introduction
The last two decades have seen a growing interest in the dynamic side of organizations. In particular,
organizations evolve over time, changing in size, internal composition and distribution of output.
The example that comes to mind are university departments, but our main ideas can be applied to
other settings like cooperative rms or political representation.
As a starting point, one may think that when the future is not an important factor, a (rational)
dominant class may take actions that will endanger the political supremacy of this class in the
future. This corresponds to the dictum by French king Louis XV "Apres moi le deluge". But
when the future plays a decisive role, one would not expect a (rational) dominant political class to
take actions that endanger their political supremacy. We may call this conjecture "The Iron Law
of Political Power". According to this law, a dominant class will peacefully endorse the political
supremacy to another class only if a) it is useful in the ght against a common enemy and agents
discount heavily the future (Llavador and Oxoby, 2005), b) it provides a Pareto improvement
(Lizzeri and Persico, 2004) or c) when the threat of violent deposition is credible (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2000 and Conley and Temini, 2001) In this paper, we present a three-class model in
which this law does not hold.
We consider an organization with a duration of an innite number of periods. Agents outside the
organization are called outsiders and those inside the organization are called insiders. These agents
are distinguished by their productivity and can be of three types: H (high), M (medium) or L
(low). We will refer to each type as a class. There is a pool of outsiders of all types who are potential
entrants in the organization. In each period, the organization takes three decisions sequentially.
First, insiders decide by majority voting how to share the output produced in this period. Second,
insiders decide by plurality who joins the organization. For simplicity, we will assume that the
organization hires just one new member every period. The hired agent will participate in the
voting of this rule and in the hiring of a new member from the next period on. Next, the agents
who wish, leave the organization and join the pool of agents outside the organization. The leaving
agents receive their reservation utility outside the organization. Finally, production takes place and
output is shared among insiders, according to the rule that the organization has voted. A class has
the political power -or is dominant- when a member of this class is a pivotal voter in the voting on
the sharing rule.
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We show that if H is the dominant class at time 0, they will vote meritocracy and they will
hire H types only. In any other case, if the discount factor  is close to one and the organization
is capable of producing a surplus, M type agents become pivotal and, eventually, they will vote
for egalitarianism and they will hire M and H agents in such a way that they stay pivotal. In
particular, if L agents are the dominant class at the starting time, they will relinquish power to the
M class. This is because, in the long run, the interest of the middle and lower classes regarding
distribution are aligned: they prefer an egalitarian distribution scheme. In addition, hiring members
of the middle class strengthens production and with an egalitarian policy this improves the payo¤s
of the lower class. We call this the Relinquish e¤ect. This e¤ect happens any time that a dominant
class relinquishes power to another class that may be more e¢ cient managing the economy. This
class will not alter either the rules or the outcome of the game. The rules may be voting or not.
For example, in imperial China under the Tang dynasty, the oligarchy relinquished a lot of their
power to the Mandarin class, which was more e¢ cient than the feudal lords, to extract surplus
from the farmers and had no intention of subverting the social order. Our paper contributes to
the understanding of how power is maintained (or lost) in organizations and how it a¤ects the
distribution of resources.
In our model, initial insiders determine the long term performance of the organization. In
particular, organizations in which the high type is not dominant in the rst period, will never
achieve a majority of high type agents, even though the percentage of high types can be close to
fty percent. All of these agents have to share their output with the other types, so they are paid
less than their productivity. We say that these agents are Exploited. And since there are high type
agents that could have been hired, we say that we have Political Unemployment, i.e. unemployment
due to the political constraints inside the organization (in this case, plurality voting).
Next, we consider nitely living agents. In this scenario we see that the demographic structure
at time zero plays an important role. In some cases, there is convergence to the equilibrium where
meritocracy holds even if we start with a majority of low types.
Our paper focuses on the policies followed by rational classes and is written in the spirit of the
monumental "A General Theory of Exploitation and Class" (1982a) in which John Roemer laid
the foundations of a rigorous analysis of exploitation and class. In this book and several posterior
writings (1982b, 1985, 1988) John Roemer uses the methods of Walrasian general equilibrium
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and game theory to show how exploitation and class relations arise from di¤erential ownership
of productive assets. Our methods are di¤erent -voting and dynamic game theory barely existed
then. Therefore, our results are not directly comparable. Our framework does not allow us to
di¤erentiate between di¤erent classes based on the property of assets such as labor or capital.
We only have di¤erent skills. However, our model, as in Roemer (1982a) Chapter 2, veries a
key Marxian insight that membership in a labor-hiring class is associated with exploiting, and
membership in a labor selling class is associated with being exploited" (p. 15, l. 6.). Roemers
specication also nds that exploitation is also viable when there are di¤erential skills (p. 20,
l. -7) which is compatible with our ndings. Finally, Roemer mentions the possibility of what he
calls status exploitation. This phenomenon is similar to the one that arises under the ruling class
in our organization because our model forces agents who join the organization to produce. In his
words: status, exploitation ... is the inequality which arises as a consequence of unequal access to
privileged positions.(p. 22, l. 4).
Our paper contributes to the dynamic theory of democratic organizations and so it covers similar
grounds to papers studying elections in stationary environments (see Duggan and Martinelli, 2015
for a survey), models of legislative bargaining (see Dziuda and Loeper, 2015 and Zapal, 2015) and
models of endogenous constituency (see Roberts, 2015 and Razin, Sadkay and Suwankiriz, 2015).
The rst paper with an endogenous set of voters is by Barbera et al (2001). They showed that
equilibrium may follow a complicated pattern like agents voting against their short term interest in
order to enhance their long term payo¤. The closest paper is by Jack and Laguno¤ (2006). They
show that an enfranchised elite may voluntarily dilute its power by expanding the franchise because
this allows the current pivotal voter to credibly commit to future policy choices. In equilibrium,
expansion occurs if and only if the private decisions of the citizenry have a net positive spillover
to the dynamic payo¤ of the current pivotal voter. This is similar to our model in which a class
relinquishes power because it is in its interest. Their model, though, is very di¤erent from ours:
technically, because it uses di¤erential calculus and in our model decisions are taken on integers.
Also in their model, there is no concern for topics that are central here like exploitation or political
unemployment. Finally, a recent paper by Barberá, Beviá and Ponsatí (2015) also tackles the
issues of egalitarianism and meritocracy using a model of coalition formation. Decisions are taken
by majority voting inside each coalition. As in our model, the inability of voters to commit to a
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distributional rule is a potential source of trouble.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model.
Section 3 presents our main results. Section 4 extends the basic model to nitely-living agents.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
An organization is a productive facility. Some agents belong to the organization and are called
insiders, and some do not belong to the organization and are called outsiders. Both the organization
and all agents last for a countable innite number of periods  = (0; 1; :::t; :::).
Agents can be of three types: H, M and L. If an agent of type T 2 fH;M;Lg is an insider,
she produces a per period gross output of oT . The per period reservation utility of an agent of
type T 2 fH;M;Lg is denoted by uT : Let xT  oT   uT be the surplus (or net output) that the
organization obtains from an agent of type T . Assume that xH > xM > xL > 0: Thus type H
is the high productivity type, M is the medium productivity type, and L is the low productivity
type. Given that surplus is positive we can assume without loss of generality that uT = 0:
In each period  , the organization takes two decisions in turn. First, the insiders in period
   1 decide how the total surplus in  is going to be shared. Second, they decide who joins the
organization and the outsiders decide if they accept the o¤er or not. Next, the agents who wish,
leave the organization and receive their reservation utility. Finally, production takes place and
output is shared among the new insiders. The timing of the decisions is motivated by the fact that
the decision on the distributive rule must be made in advance of the next hire, if not, insiders would
not know the distributive e¤ects of the hiring and outsiders would not know the exact o¤er made
to them. Furthermore, if agents leave the organization before voting, this would be equivalent to
considering an organization with a di¤erent set of agents. Thus, changes in population due to exit
will have its e¤ect both at the production moment and in the next period decision stage.
If there are nT insiders of type T = H;M;L in period  (including the new hiring in this period),
the surplus to be shared, denoted by X , is X  nHxH + nMxM + nLx: All insiders in period 
are paid a share in the surplus denoted by cT =X
 : We refer to cT as the consumption of an agent
of type T at period  : An agents payo¤ at  is just her consumption. All agents have a common
discount factor  < 1: An agents intertemporal payo¤ at  is given by
P1
t=0 
tc+tT :
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At the beginning of period 0; the organization is populated by some insiders and has a rule (i.e.
a constitution) that xes how collective decisions are taken. In this paper, we concentrate on the
case in which decisions on hiring and on the distribution of surplus are taken by plurality.
In order to simplify the model we make the following assumptions.
Assumption A1. The pool of outsiders includes agents from the three types at the start of
the game and at any history of the game.
Assumption A2. The organization hires a single outsider per period.
Assumption A3. Output is distributed by the following sharing rule
cT
X
= 
1
nH + n

M + n

L
+ (1   ) xT
X
;
where cT is the output allocated to an agent of type T in the period  and 
 2 [0; 1]:
Assumption A4. Whenever there is a tie, the highest productive agent in the organization
decides. If an agent is indi¤erent between hiring agents from di¤erent types, she will vote for the
agent from the highest type.
Assumption A5. Agents vote sincerely.
Several comments are in order: A1 is made to discard problems associated with a rigid labor
supply.
A2 is made to simplify the voting. The choice of the sharing rule described in A3 is motivated
by a result by Kang (1988) showing that for n > 2 it is the unique di¤erentiable sharing rule which
is symmetric and homogeneous of degree zero. The last property is a desirable one because it
guarantees that the share does not depend on the units in which it is measured. The deterministic
tie-breaking rule in A4 is chosen to avoid lotteries that might complicate the history of the game.
Our tie breaking rules favour excellency. Despite this, we will see that in equilibrium excellency
is not always achieved. A5 is made in order to destroy equilibria in which all agents vote for the
alternative which is at the bottom of their preferences. It means that each agent believes that her
vote is pivotal. Without this assumption we may have very complicated vote patterns (that are
highlighted in the paper by Barberá et alia, 2001) and a serious problem of multiplicity of equilibria.
This assumption can be understood as a renement of equilibria. 1
1Mavridis and Serena (2015) o¤ered an appealing solution to the problem of multiplicity of Nash equilibrium in
voting games when voting is costly.
6
Since the emphasis of our paper is on class interests, we assume that each member of each class
(types) behaves as if she were in command of her class.
At the beginning of each period  ; the history of the game can be summarized by a state,
s ; assumed to be the number of insiders at    1, that is, the voters in period  . Thus, s =
(n 1H ; n
 1
M ; n
 1
L ): The state at  + 1 depends on s
 and the action taken at  : Let S be the set
of all possible states. We only consider strategies that are state dependent. By our assumption
on sincere voting, the strategies for all members of a class can be summarized in a strategy for a
typical member of this class. Let T : S ! f0; 1g  fM;L;Hg be a strategy for a member of type
T 2 fL;M;Hg. Thus a strategy for a typical member of a type is a mapping that yields the vote
of this person on the sharing rule and on the hiring for each state. Given that the total net surplus
is always positive, no insider wants to leave and no outsider will ever reject an o¤er to join the
organization. This is why we do not model the strategy of an outsider and we do not consider the
exit option.
Our equilibrium concept is Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE in what follows). We focus on
Markovian equilibrium (as the papers quoted in the introduction did) for several reasons: They
constitute the simplest sort of equilibrium and are thus perhaps focal (Du¢ e et alia, 1986). And
they provide a simple way to model some kind of coordination "an equilibrium which does not dis-
play minimal regularity through time -maybe stationarity- is unlikely to generate the coordination
between agents that it assumes" (Guesnerie and Woodford, 1992 Section 3).
Finally, note that since the sharing rule is decided in each period, when voting on it, agents
only take into account the consumption in this period. Agents of type L (resp. H) would always
prefer  = 1 (resp.  = 0). The preferences of agents of type M will depend on the group
structure of the organization. If xM  X=(nH + nM + nL); they will prefer  = 1; and if
xM > X
=(nH + n

M + n

L) they will prefer 
 = 0: Hence, without loss of generality, we assume
that voting takes place between  = 0 -a meritocratic rule- and  = 1 -an egalitarian rule.
3. Results
We analyze the inuence of the ruling class on the evolution of the organization in terms of both
political power and resource distribution.
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We say that a type T 2 fH;M;Lg is the dominant class at time  if n 1T > n 1J + n 1K ,
J;K 2 fH;M;LgnfTg: If T is the dominant class, the pivotal voter is an agent of type T:
Our main result is the following:
Proposition 1. There exist  > 0 such that for all   ; T 2 fH;M;Lg then:
(i) In any MPE if H is the dominant class in period  , then H is dominant in all subsequent periods
and meritocracy will be the sharing rule.
(ii) In any MPE if M is the pivotal type in period  ; then M will be the pivotal type in any
subsequent period and eventually, egalitarianism will be the sharing rule.
(iii) In any MPE if L is the dominant class in period  ; then eventually egalitarianism will be the
sharing rule, although they will eventually lose political power in favor of the medium class.
We start by proving the rst part of the proposition. For the other parts we need a series
of auxiliary results that we present here. The proofs of these auxiliary results are given in the
Appendix.
Proof of (i). A type H agent will always vote for a meritocratic sharing rule in any possible
state. Furthermore, given A4, she will vote for hiring a high type agent. Thus, if H is the dominant
class in  ; they will be the dominant class in any subsequent period.
Our rst auxiliary result points out that, when there is no dominant class, for a su¢ ciently high
; the pivotal voter is a medium type. When deciding on the sharing rule, a high type agent will
always vote for a meritocratic sharing rule and a low type agent for an egalitarian rule independently
on the hiring decision. Thus, when there is no dominant class the pivotal voter is a medium type
agent. The following lemma provides conditions under which, with no dominant class, the medium
type is also pivotal in the hiring decision.
Lemma 1. There exist 0 > 0:5 such that for all   0 in any MPE, if in period  there is no a
dominant class, a type M agent is the pivotal voter.
Lemma 1 formalizes the idea that the middle class enjoys a strategic advantage with respect to
both "ends", low and high. And by exploiting the fact that one of the extremes will vote with the
middle class, this class is pivotal in the voting game when the future is very important. And, again,
when the future is very important, the middle class will target its votes on hiring to maintain this
pivotal position in the long run.
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In the following lemma we show that whenever X 1=n 1 < xM < (X 1+xH)=n , there exist
1 such that for both, medium and low type, having meritocracy today and egalitarianism from
tomorrow onwards and alternating the hiring between a medium type and a high type starting by
a medium type, is better than having egalitarianism today and hiring a high type and meritocracy
from tomorrow onwards. Let V 1E() be the continuation payo¤ in the rst case.
Lemma 2. Let X 1=n 1 < xM < (X 1+xH)=n : There exist 1 > 0:5 such that for all  > 1;
xM + V
1
E() > (X
 1 + xH)=n +

1  xM ; and (3.1)
xL + V
1
E() > (X
 1 + xH)=n +

1  xL: (3.2)
In the following Lemma we show that whenever xM < X 1=n 1 < (X 1+xH)=n , there exist
2 such that for both, medium and low type, having egalitarianism from now on and alternating
the hiring between a medium type and a high type starting by a medium type, is better than
egalitarianism today and hiring a high type and meritocracy from tomorrow onwards. Let V 2E()
be the continuation payo¤ in the rst case.
Lemma 3. Let xM < X 1=n 1 < (X 1 + xH)=n : There exist 2 such that for all  > 2;
(X 1 + xM )=n + V 2E() > (X
 1 + xH)=n +

1  xM ; and (3.3)
(X 1 + xM )=n + V 2E() > (X
 1 + xH)=n +

1  xL (3.4)
We are now prepared to prove our main result.
Proof of Proposition 1.
(ii) First of all, note that in all  such that n 1H +1 < n
 1
M +n
 1
L ; a medium type will always
prefer to hire a high type because its pivotal position on the sharing rule for the next period is not
at risk. The interesting periods are the ones in n 1H +1 = n
 1
M +n
 1
L : In those periods, by voting
for a high type, the medium class will lose its pivotal position from there on. However, let us see
that for a su¢ ciently high , the medium type will prefer to keep the power. Since the decision on
the sharing rule can be reversed in the next period, only todays payo¤s are relevant when voting
for di¤erent rules. We distinguish three cases.
Case ii1. Suppose that xM  X 1=n 1 < (X 1 + xH)=n :
In this case the medium type will vote for egalitarianism independently of the hiring. But by voting
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for a high type, the medium class will have egalitarianism today and meritocracy forever because
high types will become the dominant class. However, if they vote for a medium type they will keep
the power in the next period where again, there is no risk of losing power and a high type will be
hired. In this case, they will have egalitarianism forever. By Lemma 3 there exist 2 > 0 such that
for all   2; alternating the hiring between medium and high types is better than hiring a high
type.
Case ii2. Suppose that (X 1 + xH)=n  xM :
In this case the medium type will vote for a meritocratic rule independently of the hiring. But
by voting for a high type, the medium class will have meritocracy forever because high types will
become the dominant class. However, if they vote for a medium type they will keep the power in
the next period where again, there is no risk of losing power and a high type will be hired. From
period  it is better to alternate the hiring between medium and high starting by hiring a medium
type. This will be protable compared with hiring a high type because eventually, in some period
 0, xM < (X 1 + xH)=n ; and the medium type, by keeping the power, will get egalitarianism
from there on. Case ii1 shows that this is better than obtaining meritocracy forever.
Case ii3. Suppose that X 1=n 1  xM < (X 1 + xH)=n :
First of all, note that if the medium voter is pivotal in this case, it is because   0 (by Lemma
1). But by voting for a high type, the medium class will have egalitarianism today and meritocracy
forever because high types will become the dominant class. However, if they vote for a medium
type they will keep the power in the next period where again, there is no risk of losing power and
a high type will be hired. In this last case, they will have meritocracy today, but egalitarianism
from tomorrow on. By Lemma 2 there exist 1 such that for all   1; keeping power is the best
option.
Let M = maxf0; 1; 2g; by cases ii1, ii2, and ii3, for all   M ; if M is the pivotal type at
period  ; then M will be the pivotal type in any subsequent period and eventually, egalitarianism
will be the sharing rule.
(iii) Type L will always vote for an egalitarian rule. Furthermore, whenever n 1L > n
 1
M +
n 1H +1 they will vote for a high type and they will keep power in the next period. The interesting
periods are the ones in which n 1L = n
 1
M + n
 1
H + 1: In those periods, by voting for a high type
the lower class will cease to be the dominant class. If n 1M = 0; the high types will become the
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dominant class, and if n 1M > 0; the pivotal vote will be in the hands of the medium class. We
distinguish three cases.
Case iii1. Suppose that n 1M = 0 and xM  (X 1 + xH)=n :
By voting for a high type, the low types will lose power and they will get an egalitarian share
today but a meritocratic one from tomorrow on. If they vote for a medium type, the pivotal vote
tomorrow will be in the hands of the medium class. Given that xM  (X 1+ xH)=n by Case ii1
the medium type will keep the pivotal vote from there on and they will get egalitarianism forever.
By Lemma 3 there exist 2 such that a low type prefers to hire a medium type rather than hiring a
high type. And nally note that, hiring a low type is dominated by hiring a medium type because
in both cases egalitarianism will be obtained, but the payo¤ by hiring a medium type is larger.
Case iii2. Suppose that n 1M = 0 and (X
 1 + xH)=n  xM .
In this case the low type will prefer to hire a medium type rather than a high type. In both cases
the low types will lose political power. By hiring a high type they will have egalitarianism today
and meritocracy forever. By hiring a medium type they will have egalitarianism today, meritocracy
for some periods and then egalitarianism forever (because case ii2 will apply). A similar argument
to the one in Lemma 3 can be applied here to show that there exist 3 such that for all   3;
the low type prefers to hire a medium type rather than a high type. So either the low type hires a
medium type and loses political power or hires a low type and keeps it. In both cases egalitarianism
will be, eventually, the sharing rule.
Case iii3. Suppose that n 1M > 0. In this case, by hiring a high type the low types will
lose power in favor of the medium class which will keep the power forever if   M . Clearly
this option dominates the option of hiring a medium type. Because by doing that they are also
relinquishing power to the medium type, but the payo¤ today will be smaller. Finally, note that if
xM  (X 1+xH)=n ; egalitarianism will be the result from period  on and this is better for the
low type than hiring a new low type. If xM > (X 1+xH)=n the low types will get egalitarianism
today, meritocracy for some periods and, eventually egalitarianism again. If  is su¢ ciently large,
the loss in some periods due to meritocracy, will be compensated by a higher egalitarian payo¤
after those periods. If  is not large enough, the low types will prefer to keep power. But also in
this case the sharing rule will be meritocratic.
Summarizing, let  = maxfM ; 3g: Then, for all   ; the proposition holds.
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Proposition 1 says that when the future is very important, it is better for the high and the
middle types to maintain political power that allows then to select the sharing rule and the hiring
rather than hiring an agent with larger productivity that in the short run might increase production
but may lead to losing the ability to select sharing rules and hirings in the future. In the case of the
high type, they would only hire high types (like rst class departments only hire high class scholars).
Middle types may not be the most numerous, but they may be pivotal. And the lower class will
yield power to the middle class because they know that the middle class will be egalitarian.
Three consequences of Proposition 1 are:
1. Exploitation, dened as the existence of an agent whose payment is less than her productivity,
may arise in equilibrium in our democratic society in which voting -and not the possession of
capital- is the deciding method.
2. Agents with high productivity may be left idle because their hiring might jeopardize the
dominance of the ruling class. We propose to call this Political Unemployment. Of course,
in order to have a complete theory of unemployment, we should also model the supply side
and model how the market works. We have assumed that there is always a supply of all
types in the market so the short side of the market -the organization- is the determinant of
employment. This model is akin to the Marxist theory of the "reserve army" in which some
workers are left idle in order to maintain low wages. In our case, high types are not hired
because they constitute a threat to the power of the other classes.
3. The low class Relinquish Power to the middle class. The middle class is more productive and
eventually will vote for egalitarianism so if they are hired, there is more surplus to share.
Proposition 1 has implications for the long term composition of the organization. Let (mtH ;m
t
M ;m
t
L)
be the proportion of insidersH;M and L respectively at time t. Let ( ~mM ; ~mM ; ~mL) = limt!1(mtH ;m
t
M ;m
t
L).
Corollary 1. For a  su¢ ciently close to 1 if the dominant class at t = 0 isH then ( ~mM ; ~mM ; ~mL) =
(1; 0; 0). In any other case ( ~mM ; ~mM ; ~mL) = (0:5; 0:5; 0).
The rst part says that high quality organizations tend to continue with time. The examples of
Cambridge, Harvard, La Sorbonne and other educational institutions that have been outstanding
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for a long time come to mind.2 The second part says that institutions started by another class of
agents will never achieve full excellency. In this sense our model highlights the importance of the
founding fathers of an organization.
We dene the long run per capita output as G = limt!1(mtHxH +mMxM +m
t
LxL). It is a
measure of the e¢ ciency of an organization. We now have the following:
Corollary 2. For a  su¢ ciently close to 1 if the dominant class at t = 0 is H then G = xH . In
any other case G = 0:5xH + 0:5xM .
We can dene the instantaneous relative e¢ ciency loss of G as (xH  G)=xH . In any ine¢ cient
MPE this loss is (xH   0:5xH   0:5xM )=xH = 0:5(xH   xM )=xH . It ranges between zero and 50%.
Thus, any organization in which high types are not the dominant class at the start of the game,
will have an ine¢ cient mix of types. When, for instance, all the insiders in the rst period are low
types, the organization will experience a noteworthy increase in e¢ ciency because in the long run
high types will be half of the insiders. But it will never achieve full e¢ ciency because this will imply
that low or medium types will lose political power. This ine¢ ciency is due to the fact that new
hirings cannot sign a binding document in which they promise to vote for an egalitarian sharing
rule. Thus, as pointed out by the Coase theorem, contractual incompleteness causes ine¢ ciencies.
A possible way to solve this would be to create two categories of agents: insiders at period zero who
are the only ones with the right to vote (say they are tenured) and the rest. In this case, only high
types will be hired and the organization will achieve almost full e¢ ciency in the long run. Thus,
from this perspective, the extension of voting rights to the newly hired creates ine¢ ciencies.
4. Finitely living agents
Our assumption that agents live an innite number of periods is meant to free the model from the
"last day e¤ect". In this section we explore the consequences of assuming that agents live a nite
number of periods. An agent in her last period inside the organization will be called retiring. In
2But there are models of dynamic organizations in which this conclusion does not hold. In Sobel (2001) standards
of admission and the average quality of incumbents rise or fall without any bound (which is impossible here because
we only have three types). In Corchón (2005) there is free entry and an organization populated by high types may
be subject to the entry of many low types whose life is easier under the command of a higher type. In our model
there is no free entry.
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this new setting the state not only has to specify the number of each type of agents but who retires.
We start with a simple observation: A retiring agent will always vote for hiring a high type. This
is because junior members of the organization work but do not vote. In an egalitarian society it
is a dominant strategy for a retiring agent to vote for the H type regardless of what will happen
tomorrow. If the society is meritocratic, then retiring agents are indi¤erent between any vote, but
given A4, they will vote for a high type.
Since the results below are meant to highlight possibilities that may arise under nitely-living
agents, we simplify the model here and we assume that there are only two types of agents. We also
assume that, at most, one individual retires in each period. A state now includes the specication
of the retiring agent.
We note rst that, as in the previous section, if high types are the dominant class in some
period, they will be the dominant class from there on.
Proposition 2. In any MPE if H is the dominant class in period  , then H is dominant in all
subsequent periods and meritocracy will be the sharing rule.
Proof. A type H agent will always vote for a meritocratic sharing rule in any possible state.
Given A4 and the remark above, a high type agent, independently of whether she is a retiring
agent or not, will vote for hiring a high type. Thus, if H is the dominant class at  ; it will be the
dominant class in any subsequent period.
Thus, the existence of retiring agents will never jeopardize the predominance of the H type.
However, this will not be the case for the low types. First note that, without retiring agents, an
adaptation of Proposition 1 for two types will say that there exist  > 0 such that for all   ; if
low types are the dominant class, they will be the dominant class forever and the sharing rule will
be egalitarian. In the following proposition we show that with retiring agents, low types will lose
political power in some subgames.
Proposition 3. Suppose that in  ; n 1H + 1 = n
 1
L and the retiring agent is a low type. Then,
for all  > 0; in any MPE low types will lose political power and meritocracy will be the sharing
rule from  + 1 on.
Proof. In period  ; the political power is in the hands of low types. Thus, egalitarianism
will be the sharing rule. Given that high types and the retiring low type agents will vote for a
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high type, a high type will be hired and they will be the dominant class in the next period. By
Proposition 2, high types will be the dominant class from then on and the resulting sharing rule
will be meritocratic.
From Proposition 3 we learn that demographics have a lot to say and determine entirely that,
in some organizations, power will change hands even if all agents are non myopic.
Low types know that, in all subgames in which n 1H +1 = n
 1
L and the retiring agent is a low
type, they will lose control. However, low types can be farsighted and maintain control by using
the strategy described below:
Always vote for an egalitarian sharing rule. As a retiring agent, vote for a high type. As a
non-retiring agent, if n 1H +2 < n
 1
L vote for a high type no matter who retires. If n
 1
H +2 = n
 1
L
and the retiring agent is a high type, vote for a high type. If n 1H + 2 = n
 1
L and the retiring
agent is a low type, vote for a low type. And if n 1H + 1  n 1L they vote for a high type.
The following proposition shows that  = (L; H) ; where L is the strategy described above
and H is such that in all periods high types vote for meritocracy and for hiring a high type, is a
MPE for a su¢ ciently high :
Proposition 4. There is  > 0 such that for all   ;  = (L; H) is an MPE. Furthermore, if
n0H + 1 < n
0
L; the lower class will be the dominant class forever.
Proof. Note rst that neither a high type, nor a retiring low type has incentives to deviate from
their strategy. Note also that under this strategy, if low types are the dominant class, they will not
lose political power and egalitarianism will be the sharing rule. In states where n 1H + 2 < n
 1
L ,
is a dominant strategy for the low type to vote for a high type. Independently of who the retiring
agent is, low types will not lose political power and an egalitarian sharing rule gives larger payo¤s
with a high type. In states where n 1H + 1  n 1L ; independently of who is retiring, a low type
prefers to vote for a high type, either because they are not the dominant class and nothing will
change with their vote (A4 applies here), or they are the dominant class. That is n 1H +1 = n
 1
L ;
and the retiring agent is a high type (so hiring a high type will not change their political power), or
n 1H + 1 = n
 1
L and the retiring agent is a low type and therefore n
 1
H + 1 agents will vote for a
high type (so a high type will be selected independently of the vote of the non-retiring low types).
Finally, let us see that there are no protable deviations in states where n 1H + 2 = n
 1
L : It is
clear that no protable deviation exists if the retiring agent is a high type. If the retiring agent is
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a low type and a non-retiring low type changes her vote and votes for a high type instead of a low
type, a high type will be hired (a high type will receive the votes of the high types, the vote of the
retiring low type and the vote of the deviant). Thus, this agent will receive a better payo¤ today
(an egalitarian share with the surplus of a new high type), but the political power tomorrow will
be in the hands of the high types and will stay in their hands forever. Let us see that there exist 
such that this deviation is not protable. By deviating, this agent will get
X 1   xL + xH
n
+

1  xL: (4.1)
If she does not deviate from her strategy, in all subsequent periods t   ; nt 1H + 2 = nt 1L : Fur-
thermore, since a retiring low type (resp. high type) is replaced by a low type (resp. high type),
nt = n for all t   ; and Xt 1 = X 1: Then, the payo¤ associated with no deviation is:
X 1
n
+
X
t>
t  (
X 1
n
) =
1
1   (
X 1
n
): (4.2)
Thus, the deviation will not be protable if
(
X 1
n
)  (1  )X
 1   xL + xH
n
+ xL: (4.3)
Let F () = (1  )(X 1 xL+xH)=n + xL: Note that F () is decreasing in ; F (0) > X 1=n
and F (1) < X 1=n : Thus, there exist  such that for all   ; the deviation is not protable.
The second part of the Proposition follows directly from the fact that  is an MPE and starting
from a dominant position, in the equilibrium path the low types will not lose political power.
5. Conclusions and extensions of the model
In this paper, we have studied the evolution of resource allocation in a society in which decisions
are taken by plurality voting among three classes of citizens: highly (H), medium (M) and lowly
(L) productive. We have shown that if agents are su¢ ciently patient, if H is dominant at time
0, they will vote for meritocracy and they will hire H types only. But in any other case, M type
agents become pivotal in the voting and, eventually, they will vote for egalitarianism and they
will hire M and H agents in such a way that they stay pivotal. In particular, if L agents are a
majority at the starting time they will relinquish power to the M class. As a result, some agents
may be paid less than their productivity (exploitation) and highly productive agents may be left
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in the cold because their hiring will jeopardize the political power of the dominant class (political
unemployment). In short, voting in the workplace does not avoid the shortcomings of capitalist
economies. These shortcomings of voting -oppression of minorities or lack of e¢ ciency- have been
pointed out for a long time in the context of political systems.
The conclusions above were obtained in a particular model, but it seems to us that they are
general. Dominant classes may relinquish power to more productive classes as long as they do not
jeopardize output distribution. Thus, the Capitalist class relinquished power to the Managerial
class for precisely the same reasons. Non dominant, but very productive classes, may be exploited
by less productive classes who will also restrict the entry of potentially dangerous individuals into
the organization. Finally, our results point out the importance of the initial constituency. A
sometimes forgotten fact about the "Pilgrim Fathers" is their high level of education which might
have pervaded the future of the US. William Brewster, John Harvard, Roger Williams, etc. were
educated at Cambridge University. This initial constituency may help to explain why US converted
easily from an agricultural economy into a high tech one, a conversion that was not so successful
in other countries like Argentina and Australia (in both countries the initial constituency was very
di¤erent from the US one).
Our model can be extended in several directions, for example the consideration of di¤erent tie
breaking rules or a variable number of hirings will yield qualitatively identical predictions like our
model. We mention below other possible extensions that require some reworking of our model.
1. More types.
In this case, if the political power is in the hands of one of the lower classes, they will relinquish
it to the second most productive class. This class will hire highest productivity agents until
they are almost in majority. And once the number of the highest productive agents is large
enough, it will enforce an egalitarian distribution of the output.
2. Horizontal di¤erentiation
In this case agents may have di¤erent characteristics -say, applied economists, macro and
microeconomist. And each agent may prefer to have people from their own characteristics
rather than people with other characteristics but larger productivity. In this case, politi-
cal unemployment and exploitation may arise as a consequence of a single group becoming
dominant in the voting and concentrating the hirings and the nancing in its own group.
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3. More general sharing rules
Voting on a large space of sharing rules is likely to produce no equilibrium as happens when
voting on tax schedules. However, recently Brett and Weymark (2016) have shown that if
agents can only propose tax schedules that are optimal for some agent and preferences are
single-peaked the schedule proposed by the median skill is a Condorcet winner. It is likely
that a similar result may hold in our model if agents vote on symmetric sharing rules. If
this were the case, the equilibrium sharing rule would correspond to that preferred by the
median productivity agents which, if the number of high types is large but not dominant, is
the egalitarian.
4. Non Markovian strategies
A nagging question of our approach is what may happen if strategies are not required to be
Markovian. In particular, we may conjecture if some kind of folk theorem may be true in our
framework. A full blown investigation on the possibility of the folk theorem in our framework
is beyond the scope of this paper. We just remark that the folk theorem is not true in general
dynamic games and that the conditions found in the literature to obtain a folk theorem, are
not met by our model. Thus Dutta (1995) requires that "for a folk theorem to hold, there
must be some similarity in the possibilities from di¤erent states" (p. 10). This condition
does not hold in our framework since the kind of punishments that you can apply by voting,
is heavily dependent on the number of agents in each category, i.e. on the state. A recent
contribution by Horner et alia (2011) assumes that "the limit set of equilibrium payo¤s is
independent of the initial state" (p. 1281) which is not the case in our model in which the
number of insiders in the rst period determines long run payo¤s.
Finally, there are other extensions that would require a complete revamping of our model and,
therefore, despite the fact that they are important, are not pursued here: Shortages of types
in the market and competition between several organizations. In the rst case voters have to
balance carefully between hiring an agent which is not the rst best today and waiting for a
more suitable candidate in the future. This balance will depend on the di¤erence in productivity
between candidates and the waiting time and it is not likely to yield a clear-cut result. The second
extension is to our taste the most promising. But it would require careful thought about how to
model competition among organizations. We leave this for future research.
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6. Appendix
First, let us introduce some notation. Let VJ(T ) be the continuation payo¤ for a type J agent when
hiring a type T agent. Note rst that VL(T )  VM (T )  VH(T ): This is because in each period,
the rule is either meritocratic or egalitarian. If it is egalitarian, everyone receives the same, if it is
meritocratic the higher the type the higher the payo¤ obtained.
Proof of Lemma 1.Given A5, a high type agent will always vote for a meritocratic sharing
rule and a low type agent for an egalitarian rule independently of the hiring decision. Thus, when
there is no dominant class, when deciding on the sharing rule, the pivotal voter is a medium type
agent. Let us see that for  su¢ ciently high, the medium type is also pivotal when voting on the
hiring. First note that, under A4 and A5, an agent will always vote for hiring another agent oh
her type or of a higher type. Thus, if a medium type prefers to hire a high type, a high type will
be hired. Furthermore, given A4, and A5, in all  such that n 1H + 1 > n
 1
M + n
 1
L ; a medium
type will always prefer to hire a high type because her pivotal vote on the sharing rule for the next
period is not at risk. If n 1H + 1 = n
 1
M + n
 1
L ; there is a trade o¤ because by hiring a high type,
the medium class will lose its pivotal vote on the sharing rule in the next period in favor of the
high type, and by part (i) in Proposition 1 we will get meritocracy from there on. To discuss the
implications of the voting behavior we distinguish three cases.
(i) Suppose that at  ; (X 1 + xH)=n  xM :
Since the pivotal voter on the sharing rule is the medium type, she will vote for a meritocratic
sharing rule independently of the new hiring. Suppose that the medium type prefers to hire another
medium type. Thus,
xM + VM (M) > xM + VM (H) = xM +

1  xM : (6.1)
Which implies that some of the terms in VM (M) are the result of an egalitarian rule with a payo¤
greater than xM : Given that VL(T )  (1=(1  ))xL for all T 2 fH;M;Lg; VL(M) > (1=(1  ))xL:
Thus, in this situation a low type agent will also prefer to hire a medium type. As a result, a
medium type will be hired.
(ii) Suppose that at  ; xM  X 1=n 1 < (X 1 + xH)=n :
Since the pivotal voter on the sharing rule is the medium type, she will vote for an egalitarian
sharing rule independently of hiring a high or a medium type. Suppose that the medium type
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prefers to hire another medium type. Thus,
X 1 + xM
n
+ VM (M) >
X 1 + xH
n
+

1  xM : (6.2)
Or equivalently
X 1 + xH
n
  X
 1 + xM
n
< (VM (M)  1
1  xM ): (6.3)
Let us see that the low type also prefers to vote for a medium type. Note that VM (M) and VL(M)
only di¤er in the periods where meritocracy is the resulting sharing rule (if any of these periods
exist). Thus,
VM (M)  VL(M) < 1
1   (xM   xL): (6.4)
Therefore, if (6.3) holds, then
X 1 + xH
n
  X
 1 + xM
n
< (VL(M)  1
1  xL) (6.5)
also holds and the low type will also prefer to hire a medium type.
(iii) Suppose that at  ; X 1=n 1  xM < (X 1 + xH)=n :
Since the pivotal voter on the sharing rule is the medium type, she will vote for a meritocratic
sharing rule if a medium type is hired, and for an egalitarian one if a high type is hired. Suppose
that the medium type prefers to hire another medium type. Thus,
xM + VM (M) >
X 1 + xH
n
+

1  xM : (6.6)
Or equivalently
1  2
1   xM + VM (M) >
X 1 + xH
n
: (6.7)
Because in all periods where the pivotal vote of the medium type on the sharing rule is not at risk
a new high type is hired, from +1 on, the sharing rule will be egalitarian. This is because once we
hire a high type, the average surplus is above xM and from there on, regardless of whether a high
or a medium type is hired, the average surplus will remain above xM : Thus, VM (M) = VL(M):
Furthermore, let us see that the left hand side of (6.7) is increasing in . Let yt denote the t-term
in VM (M); recall that yt > xM for all t: The derivative with respect to  of the left hand side of
(6.7) is
 1
(1  )2xM + VM (M) + 
@VM (M)
@
: (6.8)
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Given that VM (M) =
P1
t=0 
tyt >
P1
t=0 
txM = (1=(1  ))xM ; and
@VM (M)
@
=
1X
t=1
tt 1yt >
1X
t=1
tt 1xM = (1=(1  )2)xM ; (6.9)
then (6.8) is positive. Thus, the left hand side of (6.7) is increasing in : Therefore, if (6.7) holds
for some ; it holds for all 0 > : Finally note that for  > 0:5; whenever (6.7) holds,
1  2
1   xL + VL(M) >
X 1 + xH
n
(6.10)
also holds and thus low types will also prefer to hire a medium type.
Summarizing, there exist 0 > 0:5 such that for all   0 in any MPE, if at period  there is
no a dominant class, a type M agent is the pivotal voter.
Proof of Lemma 2. First of all note that V 1E() is
V 1E() =
1X
t=0
2t+1

X 1 + (t+ 1)xM + (t+ 1)xH
n + 2t+ 1

+
1X
t=1
2t

X 1 + (t+ 1)xM + txH
n + 2t

: (6.11)
The rst term corresponds to all the periods where a high type is hired and the second term to
the periods where a medium type is hired. First, note that since  < 1; all power series in V 1E()
are convergent. Note also that all terms in V 1E() are larger than xM : Let us see that there exist
1 > 0:5 such that the rst three terms in xM+V 1E() are bigger than (X
 1+xH)=n+xM+2xM :
Formally, let us see that there is 1 > 0:5 such that for all  > 1;
xM + (
X 1 + xM + xH
n + 1
) + 2(
X 1 + 2xM + xH
n + 2
) >
X 1 + xH
n
+ xM + 
2xM : (6.12)
For  = 0; the left hand side of (6.12) is xM which is smaller than (X 1+xH)=n : As  converges
to 1; the left hand side converges to
xM +
X 1 + xM + xH
n + 1
+
X 1 + 2xM + xH
n + 2
; (6.13)
and the right hand side converges to
X 1 + xH
n
+ xM + xM : (6.14)
Let us see that
X 1 + xM + xH
n + 1
+
X 1 + 2xM + xH
n + 2
>
X 1 + xH
n
+ xM ; (6.15)
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or equivalently,
X 1 + 2xM + xH
n + 2
  xM > X
 1 + xH
n
  X
 1 + xM + xH
n + 1
; (6.16)
X 1 + xH   nxM
n + 2
>
X 1 + xH   nxM
n (n + 1)
(6.17)
Since n  2; n (n + 1) is larger than (n + 2); (6.15) holds.
Let
F () = (1     2)xM + (X
 1 + xM + xH
n + 1
) + 2(
X 1 + 2xM + xH
n + 2
): (6.18)
We have seen that F (0) < (X 1 + xH)=n ; and that lim!1 F () > (X 1 + xH)=n ; note also
that since (X 1 + xM + xH)=(n + 1) > xM ; and (X 1 + 2xM + xH)=(n + 2) > xM ; F () is
increasing in : Thus, we can nd 1 > 0:5 such that for all  > 1, F () > (X 1 + xH)=n ; as we
wanted to prove.
Finally, note that for  > 0:5; if (3.1) holds, then (3.2) also holds.
Proof of Lemma 3. Note rst that if (3.3) holds, given that xM > xL; (3.4) also holds. Also
note that V 2E() can be written as (6.11) in Lemma 2. As in Lemma 2, all terms in V
2
E() are larger
than xM : Let us see that there exist 2 such that the rst three terms in (X 1+xM )=n + V 2E()
are larger than (X 1 + xH)=n + xM + 2xM : That is, there is 2 such that in three periods, we
compensate the initial loss of getting (X 1 + xM )=n compared with obtaining (X 1 + xH)=n .
Formally, let us see that there is 2 such that for all  > 2;
(X 1 + xM )=n + (
X 1 + xM + xH
n + 1
) + 2(
X 1 + 2xM + xH
n + 2
) >
X 1 + xH
n
+ xM + 
2xM :
(6.19)
Given that (X 1+xM )=n > xM ; we can apply the argument in Lemma 2 to ensure the existence
of 2:
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